Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 7

January 1986

Constitutional Law
Maria Mandolini-Astengo

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Maria Mandolini-Astengo, Constitutional Law, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1986).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Mandolini-Astengo: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FRASER v. BETHEL SCHOOL
DISTRICT: NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS A

STUDENT'S FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Fraser v. Bethel School District, l the Ninth Circuit held
that a school district violated a student's first amendment rights
by punishing him for his use of sexual innuendo in a student
election campaign speech. II The court refused to extend Federal
Communication Commission v. Paci/ica 3 to a high school
environment. 4
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision issuing
a declaratory judgment for the plaintiff and enjoining the school
district from prohibiting plaintiff from speaking at his graduation. 1I The plaintiff was awarded $278 as damages and $12,750
for costs and attorney's fees.'
1. 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Norris, J.j the other panel members were
Goodwin, J., and Wright, J.), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 2463 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1985) (No.
84-1667).
2. 755 F.2d at 1365.
3. 438 U.S. 726 (1976). A radio station aired comedian George Carlin's "Filthy
Words" dialogue at two o'clock in the afternoon. Responding to a parent complaint, the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) found the radio station in violation of a statute prohibiting the broadcast of indecent speech. The Supreme Court, in a plurality
opinion, held that the FCC regulation of indecent speech was constitutional under the
first amendment. The seven words to which the FCC took offense were fuck, shit, piss,
motherfucker, cocksucker, cunt and tit. Id. at 751.
4. 755 F.2d at 1363.
5. Id. at 1357. Although Fraser's name had been removed from the election ballot,
he was elected as a write-in candidate. Id.
6. Id. at 1358.
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II. FACTS
In Fraser the plaintiff was Matthew Fraser, a seventeenyear-old high school senior at Bethel High School in Tacoma,
Washington.' During a student run assembly, he nominated a
friend for school office by delivering the following speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants,
he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but
most of all his belief in you, the students of
Bethel is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes
his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack
things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man
who will go to the very end-even the climax, for
each and everyone of you. So vote for Jeff for
ASB vice president-he'll never come between
you and the best our school can be. 8

The day after the speech, Fraser was charged by defendant
Bethel School District with violating the school's disruptive conduct rule. 9 He was suspended for three days and his name was
removed from the graduation speaker ballot. Fraser filed a grievance of disciplinary action with the Superintendent of Bethel
School District. When the grievance was denied, Fraser brought
a civil rights action in district court. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the district court held that the school district had violated Fraser's rights under the first amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act. 10 Defendants ap7. Id. at 1357. The majority noted that Fraser was an honor student and a member
of the school's debate team. He had also won "Top Speaker" award in a statewide competition for two consecutive years. Id.
8.ld.
9. Id. at 1357 n.l. The school's rule as published in the student handbook stated:
In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission
of, or participation in certain non-criminal activities or acts
may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are acts
which disrupt and interfere with the educational process.
Disruptive conduct: Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.

Id.
10. 1d. at 1358.
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pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
III. BACKGROUND
The first amendment of the United States Constitution
states: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech."Il This seemingly broad statement has been defined
and tailored by the United States Supreme Court.
In Terminiello v. Chicago, III the Supreme Court recognized
that a speech often serves its most important function when it
shocks its audience or stirs unrest. 13 In reversing a breach of the
peace conviction where an abrasive speaker had incited an angry
crowd, the Court emphasized that speech is often challenging
and provocative but is nevertheless protected, since one major
purpose of the free speech clause is to protect speech that invites dispute."
The emotive function of speech was recognized in Cohen v.
Ca lifornia ,111 a case considering offensive speech. The Supreme
Court held that offensive speech is protected under the first
amendment. It stated that offensive speech may not be regulated merely because the state wishes to eliminate such words to
protect public morality. IS However, the Cohen majority expressly excluded obscenity from this protection, adhering to the
Court's previous holding determining obscenity to be unprotected speech under the first amendment. 17
11. u.s. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 287 U.S. 233,
244 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
12. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). A speaker in an auditorium caused several disturbances in a
crowd gathered outside the auditorium to protest the speech. The speaker was convicted
with violating a breach of the peace ordinance. The trial court had instructed the jury
that speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of
unrest or creates a disturbance" violated the ordinance. The Supreme Court reversed the
trial court. I d. at 3-5.
13. ld. at 4.
14. ld. at 6.
15. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Appellant had been convicted for "maliciously and willfully
disturbing the peace of any neighbor or person ... by ... offensive conduct," for wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" while in a courthouse hall. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction. ld. at 16.
16. ld. at 24.
17. ld. at 20. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (guidelines describing
obscenity as: (a) whether an average person, applying contemporary community stan-
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In considering "indecent" speech, the Court has retreated
from its trend of protection at least where that speech occurs in
the context of broadcasting. For example, in Federal Communication Commission u. Paci/ica I8 the Court held that indecent
speech that is patently offensive may be regulated even though
it is not legally obscene. I9
Historically, protection of first amendment rights has also
been applied to schools. In West Virginia u. Barnette,20 the Supreme Court stated that the function of the Bill of Rights is to
protect citizens against the state and all its creations, including
boards of education. U The Court held that under the first
amendment, public school students could not be compelled to
salute the flag. 22 Their analysis included a balancing approach
which considered the school's function as an educator and the
students' right to exercise their freedom of expression without
state control. 23
Another case which has helped define students' rights to
freedom of speech is Tinker u. Des Moines School District. 24
The Court there held that high school students did not shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the high
school gate.2& The Court did, however, limit the protection of
student speech to that which did not materially disrupt classwork,' or involve substantial disorder, or invade the rights of
dards would find that the work as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether
the work describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as defined by state law;
and (c) whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific
value); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (states may regulate commerce in obscene material and exhibition of obscene material in places of public accomodation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not protected
speech under the first amendment).
18. 438 U.S. 726 (1976).
19. Id. at 750-51. For the majority the term, "patently offensive" meant words that
have no intrinsic value and refer to sexual and excretory organs. Id. at 732 (citing In re
Citizen's Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975».
20. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
21. Id. at 637.
22. Id. at 642.
23. Id. at 638-40.
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court held, inter alia, that high school students who
wore black armbands in school to protest the Vietnam War could not be punished for
doing so under the first amendment. Id. at 514.
25. Id. at 506.
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others.26 It established that a student's right to expression must
be defined by considering the special functions of the school. 27
Freedom of speech was recognized as vital in the context of
American public schools. 28 The classroom itself was deemed to
be a marketplace of ideas.29
The Supreme Court recently stated in Board of Education
v. Pico sO that teachers and school officials must be given broad
discretion over decisions concerning the education of students,
but that this discretion must be limited by the imperatives of
the first amendment. SI In addition, that case limited the school
officials' discretion to curriculum decisions within the confines of
the classroom. s2 Once the school officials' decisions were deemed
to be curriculum decisions, and constitutional values were implicated, the Court used a balancing approach in its analysis. The
Court balanced the students' right to free speech with the
school's function of educating students,Ss much like the original
approach in Barnette. s•
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

THE MAJORITY

The Ninth Circuit recognized that in the context of the
school environment, the first amendment does not prohibit
26. [d. at 509. The majority stated that students cannot be regarded as "closedcircuit recipients" of only the materials which school officials or the state wished to communicate. It also stated that "state operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism." [d. at 511.
27. [d. at 506.
28. [d. at 512.
29. [d. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967».
30. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
31. [d. at 864.
32. [d. at 863. In Pica, the library was not considered the compulsory confinement
of the classroom, therefore, it was not subject to regulation with absolute discretion by
school officials. [d.
33. [d. at 869-72. The circuit court decisions have not been clear in defining what
falls within the scope of school curriculum. Compare Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214
(3rd Cir. 1981) (school play, sponsored by school in evening hours considered part of
school curriculum) and Trachman V. Arker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977) (student poll of
students' sexual knowledge, preference, and experience, to be published in school newspaper was part of the curriculum) with Thomas V. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2nd
Cir. 1979) (student-published "indecent" publication not printed or sold within school
was not part of school curriculum).
34. 319 U.S. at 638-40.
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school officials from disciplining students who materially disrupt
the educational process. 3Ci It continued, however, to outline some
limits that school districts must adhere to when first amendment rights are implicated. Specifically, the court discussed
whether Fraser's speech was indecent, and if so, whether that
exempted it from first amendment protection.
First, the court concluded that the only first amendment
standard appropriate in this application was the material disruption test articulated in Tinker u. Des Moines School District. 38 A test involving a judgment of the "appropriateness" of
speech by school administrators was expressly rejected by the
majority.37 It noted that the mere fact that teachers or administrators disapproved of the speech did not necessarily mean that
the educational process had been disrupted. 3s The court followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tinker, that unless
the student's behavior rose to a level of material interference
with the educational process, it did not justify the infringement
on the student's right to freedom of expression. 39
The court also concluded that although the first amendment
allows school officials to discipline students who materially disrupt the educational process, the testimony offered by the school
district was insufficient to show that Fraser had materially disrupted classwork. 40 The court found that the Bethel School Dis35. 755 F.2d at 1359.
36. [d. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). See
supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
37. 755 F.2d at 1361. In the district court, the testimony of both the principal and
vice-principal expressed that, in their views, the word "inappropriate" was synonymous
with "disruptive" in the context of the school. [d.
38. [d. at 1363.
39. [d. at 1360.
40. Id. at 1359. The following testimony is from a teacher, Irene Hicks, describing
the students' reaction to Fraser's speech:
A: The best way to describe it, I think, is mixed. There were
pockets of loud clapping, hoots and hollering and then there
were other students that were sitting there, I guess my best
words to describe it is as rather bewildered, not understanding
what the kids were clapping about and why there was such a
difference in reception to the speech.
Gary McCutcheon, a school counselor, also described what he heard at the assembly:
Q: Let's first go with what did you hear from the student
body?
A: Not too dissimilar to what Mrs. Hicks just reported, the
students were pockets of high volume conversations hooting,
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trict had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Fraser's use of sexual innuendo in his speech had substantially
disrupted or materially interfered with the educational process. 41
There were several factors that the court found significant
in making this determination. 42 The fact that Fraser's speech
did not delay the assembly and that school administrators were
able to maintain order without any difficulty suggested that
there had been no disruption. 43 Even though the speech evoked
much hooting and yelling in the audience, it was found to be a
typical reaction in a high school auditorium and, therefore, not
unduly disruptive." Moreover, the court found that although
the speech was a popular topic of conversation among students
during classes on the following day, that was not significant
enough to amount to a material disruption. 4Ii
Second, the Ninth Circuit found the Supreme Court's rationales in Federal Communications Commision u. Pacifica,4e
which sanctioned government regulation of indecent speech, inapplicable to a high school assembly.47 Bethel School District
had argued that if the FCC could keep indecent language off the
air in the afternoon, then a school district could keep indecent
language from circulating in a high schooVs even if it did not
yelling, which is not atypical to a high school auditorium assembly and the auditory, the sounds were not too dissimilar to
any auditorium sounds I have heard over the many assemblies
I have been at Bethel High School.
Q: Were there physical activities as well?
A: I think of particular interest might be perhaps was something I hadn't seen before. I had seen one student on the side
of the bleachers where I was sitting actually simulate masturbation and two students on the opposite bleachers were simulating the sexual intercourse movements with hips.
[d.
41. [d.

42. [d. at 1360. The court found Fraser indistinguishable from Tinker on the issue
of disruption. The court reasoned that just as the record in Tinker failed to show that
wearing the black armbands interfered with school activities, the record here failed to
show that Fraser's use of sexual innuendo in his speech interfered with the activities at
Bethel High School. [d.
43. [d.
44. [d.
45. [d. at 1361.

46. 438 U.S. 726 (1976).
47. 755 F.2d at 1363.
48. [d. at 1361 (citing Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2nd Cir.
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disrupt classwork. The court distinguished Pacifica by emphasizing that broadcasting received the most limited first amendment protection for two reasons: (1) it intrudes into the privacy
of the home of an unwilling listener,'9 and (2) it is available to
unsupervised children, even those too young to read. CiO
The first rationale, that broadcasting is intrusive upon the
privacy of the home, was found clearly inapplicable to the voluntary high school assembly in Fraser. The majority reasoned that
while the Supreme Court has given homes a higher level of privacy protection,Cil by comparison, a high school assembly is a
very public place. Thus, the students, who voluntarily attended
this assembly to hear campaign speeches, did not expect the
same level of privacy that they would have expected in their
homes. Ci2
The court found that the second rationale in Pacifica was
also inapplicable since the speech in issue was not made to children too young to read, but to young adults who were very near
the voting age. Concluding, the court stated that, "Realistically,
high school students are beyond the point of being sheltered
from the potpourri of sights and sounds we encounter at every
turn in our daily lives. "Ci3
Third, the court concluded that the school officials did not
have unlimited discretion to prohibit speech which they deemed
"indecent."Ci' It reasoned that although school officials have
broad discretion in controlling the content of school curriculum, CiCi Fraser's speech was not made as part of the school curriculum. CiS The court found the school district's reliance on Board
of Education v. Pico Ci7 misplaced. Ci8 Pico was not controlling in
this case because it had stated that school boards could not ex1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
49. 755 F.2d at 1362.
50.Id.
51. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
52. 755 F.2d at 1362.
53. Id. at 1363.
54.Id.
55. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
56. 755 F.2d at 1364.
57. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
58. 755 F.2d at 1364.
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tend their absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom. &9 Thus, the majority argued, a fortiori,
that a high school assembly was not the environment of the
classroom, emphasizing the voluntary nature of the assembly.60
Finally, the court stressed that Fraser's speech must be especially protected since it was of a political nature, made in the
context of the student government process. 61 It found that the
speech was made under the protection of the first amendment,
since it was delivered in a forum where students were invited to
express their political views. 62
B.

THE DISSENT

Justice Wright, dissenting, argued that the Tinker material
disruption test was inapplicable in the context of indecent
speech.68 He reasoned that Tinker was concerned with pure political speech in which there is an expectation that schools remain neutral. 64 In contrast, the Bethel School's regulation of
Fraser's speech was only concerned with the indecent manner in
which the idea was expressed, rather than its particular
viewpoint. 6&
The dissent argued that even if the Tinker standard were
applied it would conclude that the educational process had been
disrupted. It pointed out that a speech which caused students to
become distracted, excited or embarrassed could interfere with
the school's educational function just as much as would the outbreak of a fight.66 It also stated that it would be unwise for
courts to second -guess the judgment of school authorities in de59. Id. See also Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (limiting school authorities' discretion to the
compulsory environment of the classroom).
60. 755 F.2d at 1364.
61. Id. at 1365.
62.Id.
63. Id. at 1369. The dissent deferred to the school authorities' judgment which in·
terpreted Fraser's speech to be "indecent." Id.
64.Id.
65. Id. See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. The plurality opinion stated, "A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id.
66. 755 F.2d at 1364 (citing Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools:
The Case Against Judicial Intervention, '59 TEx, L. REV. 477, 496-510 (1981».
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ciding when the educational process had been disrupted. s7
The dissent based most of its argument on the conclusion
that Fraser's speech was made as part of the school curriculum,
therefore, giving school authorities greater discretion in its regulation. It stressed that the speech was made during school hours
as a school sponsored event. SS Students were required to attend
unless they went to a study hall. 6D Also, the dissent stressed the
fact that the speech was delivered as part of the official school
curriculum designed to teach students rhetoric and leadership.70
The dissent also focused on the nature of the school environment and the special demands of schools in educating students, arguing that it necessitated special treatment for first
amendment purposes. 71 The physically confining nature of the
school and the immaturity of the students raised captive audience concerns.72 Under a captive audience analysis, it was relevant that the students were not warned that sexual innuendo
would be used in the speeches and that it was difficult for students to leave once they entered the auditorium. 73
The fact that the speech was made to minors was deemed
very significant, since the dissent argued that more limits on
speech are permissible when speech is aimed at children rather
than adults. 74 It supported this argument by stating that school
authorities stood in loco parentis, having the duty to enforce
minimum standards of student expression. 711 It concluded by
stressing the school's role as an inculcator of societal values with
the power to instill the values of citizenship, discipline and acceptable morals. 76
67. Id. at 1369-70 (citing Diamond, supra note 66, at 486).
68. 755 F.2d at 1366.
69. Id. at 1367.
70. Id. at 1366, 1368.

71. Id. at 1367.

72.Id.
73.Id.
74.Id.
75.Id.
76. Id. at 1370.
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The Ninth Circuit correctly limited Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica" to its facts by refusing to apply
its rationales to a high school assembly. The Pacifica decision
was premised on the special nature of broadcasting. The facts
that offensive speech intruded into the privacy of the home and
that it could reach unsupervised children were necessary in
reaching the Pacifica Court's result. Neither of these two rationales were implicated in Fraser.
In Fraser, the speech was delivered in a public school, as a
political expression in support of a particular candidate running
for school office. 78 It was directed at an audience of students approximately between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. 79 The
purpose of Fraser's speech was to persuade the voting student
body to support his candidate. He made a politically tactical decision by appealing to his audience's sense of humor via sexual
innuendo to make his point. Although it may have been a risky
choice, it was one that ultimately proved successful. 80
Fraser is also distinguishable from Pacifica in that the latter specifically focused on the nature of the "patently offensive"
language there existent. Each word was inherently offensive,
particularly the seven "filthy words" in George Carlin's mono77. 438 U.S. 726 (1976).

78. 755 F.2d at 1365.
79. For a discussion regarding the maturity and intellectual sophistication of high
school students, see Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970). The Seventh Circuit, analysing the effect of the statement "Oral sex
may prevent toothdecay," noted that "[tjhis attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an
older generation. But today's students in high school are not insulated from the shocking
but legally accepted language used by demonstrators and protestors in streets and on
campuses and by authors of best-selling modern literature." See also Nahmod, First
Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18
WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1491 (1972) (noting that Tinker and underground newspaper cases
suggest that difference between the maturity of high school and college students is no
longer clear); Note, Tinker Goes to the Theater: First Amendment Rights and High
School Theatrical Productions in Seyfried v. Walton, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 27578 (1984) (arguing that courts should take judicial notice of the age and maturity of high
school students); Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious
Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 507-09 (1983) (discussing adolescents'
psychological maturity and concluding that adolescents may have a high "tolerance of a
diversity of views and an approval of First Amendment free speech values.").
80. 755 F.2d at 1363 n.9. Fraser's candidate was subsequently elected. Id.
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logue. 81 On the other hand, the language at issue in Fraser's
speech was merely innuendo, verbal imagery in the form of a
poem. 82 This type of language would be the most dangerous to
regulate because o(its abstract nature and because of the difficulty in separating the words from the ultimate message meant
to be conveyed.
It has been asserted by some, including the majority in Cohen, that it cannot be assumed that content and form of language are somehow separable. 8s The Supreme Court in Cohen
recognized that words serve an important emotive, as well as a
cognitive, function. 84 Purifying public discourse may exclude
from the marketplace of ideas those messages that may only be
expressed in the language of the street. 811 As Justice Harlan
stated for the Cohen majority, "One man's vulgarity is another's
lyric."88

Bethel School District argued that schools have the authority to regulate language which school authorities find offensive. 87
This is precisely the kind of argument that the Cohen majority
rejected. 88 Unless the state is to ignore the Cohen decision, it
cannot constitutionally prohibit offensive speech outside the
area of broadcasting. School boards as creatures of the state are
also forbidden from interfering within the realm of protected
speech.89 The only exceptions to first amendment protection
which are relevant in the area of offensive speech are obscenity,
fighting words, and captive audience concerns.
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751.
82. 755 F.2d at 1363. Note that even if such verbal imagery were deemed to be legally obscene, the court would still consider whether "the work taken as a whole, lacks
8erious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973).
83. 403 U.S. at 26. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-10
at 619 (1978) (discussing the Cohen opinion with approval).
84. 403 U.S. at 26.
85. Id. at 25.
86.Id.
87. 755 F.2d at 1361.
88. 403 U.S. at 25. The Cohen majority discussed the difficulty in determining which
words were "offensive." It stated that because the concept of "offensiveness" is so limitless, the Constitution "leaves matters of taste and style ... largely to the individual."
Id.
89. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943».
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The School District did not contend that Fraser's speech
was obscene under the current legal definition. 90 Nor was there
any suggestion by the defendants that the speech consisted of
"fighting words."91 The Fraser court did consider the captive audience issue. 92 In general, audience complaint appears to be an
important factor when considering the captive audience issue. In
Pacifica, the FCC was responding to a listener's vigorous complaint regarding George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue.
The Pacifica majority noted this, contrasting Cohen where there
were no objecting citizens who had taken offense at the defendant's "Fuck the Draft" inscription on his jacket.93 As in Cohen,
those being allegedly protected from the "offensive" speech in
Fraser had not themselves objected. For that matter, neither
had their parents. 9" The record in Fraser reflects only the testimony of a few school authorities who had complained about the
speech. 911 Under a Pacifica captive audience analysis this would
not be a sufficient basis for labeling Fraser's audience as
captive. 96
The dissent in Fraser made the tenuous argument that,
since students only had the choice of going to a study hall rather
than to the assembly, they were captive. 97 The dissent seems to
suggest that the students' decision was an involuntary one. Arguably, the captive audience exception does not solely require an
application of a traditional voluntariness test. The Cohen majority defined a captive audience by stating that "substantial privacy interests" must be invaded in an "intolerable manner."98 In
Fraser, there was no evidence showing that the privacy interest
of the student audience had been invaded in an intolerable
manner.
Courts must begin their speech regulation analysis with the
premise that government cannot justify the suppression of
speech merely because its content or form is offensive to some
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.

755 F.2d at 1361 n.5.
[d.
[d. at 1364-65.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1976».
755 F.2d at 1361 n.4.
[d. at 1361.
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25.
755 F.2d at 1367 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 7

30

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:17

members of the audience. 99 Fraser's political speech should be
especially protected in the context of the school environment
since schools have been deemed special marketplaces of ideas. loo
The future of our nation depends on leaders trained through the
exposure to a "robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
'out of a multitude of tongues.' "101 If the school is able to suppress speech at its whim, especially in the political context, students will be denied the opportunity to develop their political
character in a meaningful way.
By teaching basic communication skills, as well as knowledge and patterns of thinking, schools prepare students to exercise those political freedoms which are at the core of a democratic society. Bethel High School was actually training its
students for a role in a democratic society when it allowed them
to make speeches regarding upcoming candidates in the school's
election. l02 When a school punishes a student for delivering such
a political speech, it sends the message that the free flow of
ideas is not truly permitted. The result would be to covertly inculcate the school's questionable value system. 103 At a minimum,
the exchange of ideas in the context of education makes the
casting of a ballot more meaningfu1. 104 It may also motivate students to develop interests in public issues which may trigger involvement in other civic and political activities. lOll
It would be unacceptable to democratic values to allow the
government, through school boards, to regulate speech on the
basis of its perceived merits. What should be considered instead
is the relative importance of the interests involved. l08 In Fraser,
the interests were political expression and free speech vis-a-vis
the educational process. The value of freedom of expression in
this case greatly outweighs any interest the school may have as
99. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
101. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
102. 755 F.2d at 1365.
103. See Arons and Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 317 (1980).
104. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 608, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
618 (1971).
105. ld.
106. See Scanlon Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
PITI'. L. REV. 519, 521-23 (1979).
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long as the educational process is not disrupted under a Tinker
standard. 107 In Fraser, the educational process was not so
disrupted.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Fraser, the Ninth Circuit properly struck a balance in
favor of the student's right to free speech. Neither the student
audience's privacy expectations, nor the school authorities' feelings of discomfort outweigh the student's right to freedom of expression under the first amendment.
Maria Mandolini-Astengo*

107. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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BUNYAN V. CAMACHO: GUAM'S RETIREMENT CREDIT
STATUTE FAILS EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bunyan v. Camacho l the Ninth Circuit held that a statute 2 granting retroactive retirement credit only to local government employees who were Guam residents prior to starting college, violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. 3 The court found that the statute was not rationally related to any legitimate governmental purpose.·
1. 770 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were Sneed,
J., and Rafeedie, D.J., Central District of California, sitting by designation).
2. The statute in issue states as follows:
Any bona fide resident of Guam who receives his graduate or
undergraduate degree from an accredited institution and is
employed by the government of Guam, after obtaining such
degree, may claim retirement credit equal to the period of
time, including vacations, which a full-time student would
normally take to complete the program leading to the degree
he received, ... by paying to the Fund the appropriate member's and employer's shares ... , provided, however, that this
section shall apply only to those persons:
(a) who received their degrees after June I, 1945;
(b) who were bona fide residents of Guam at the time they
began their undergraduate studies; and
(c) who had been employed by the Government for at least ten
(10) years as full-time, locally hired employees.
4 Guam Code Ann. § 8113 (1983).
3. 770 F.2d at 776.
4. [d.

33
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The plaintiff was William K. Bunyan, a high school science
teacher, who had moved to Guam in 1963, after completing college. 6 He met all of the statutory requirements to be eligible for
retroactive retirement credit except that he had not been a
Guam resident at the time he began college. s
Plaintiff brought a civil rights action7 against the members
of the Board of Trustees for the Government of Guam Retirement Fund. 8 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants,9 finding that the statute, as applied to persons
already employed by the government, was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. IO That purpose was the expression of gratitude by the Territory of Guam to those residents who had gone to college, graduated and returned to Guam
"with their specialized knowledge, skill, and training to work for
the Government of Guam, prior to the enactment of this statute."l1 Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit.12
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit initiated its analysis by recognizing that
absent a suspect classification or the infringement of a fundamental right, the equal protection clause would be violated only
if the difference in treatment between the two classes of government employees did not bear a rational relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose. IS It found the district court's reliance on Devereaux v. New York Teachers' Retirement Board l4
misplaced. 111
The Ninth Circuit noted that the reccent trend in equal
5. [d. at 774.
6. [d.
7. [d. This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1982).

8. 770 F.2d at 774.
9.
10.
11.
12.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

13. [d. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. 75 A.D.2d 277, 429 N.Y.S.2d 743, appeal denied, 51 N.Y.2d 705 (1980). The
Devereaux court found that it was a legitimate state purpose for New York to express
gratitude to its citizens who had served in the military by conferring benefits on them to
which others were not entitled. 75 A.D.2d at 281·82, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
15. 770 F.2d at 775.
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protection analysis is to restrict the types of past contributions
which may be rewarded, as well as the bases for distinguishing
between classes which are rewarded and those which are not. IS It
then pointed out that the defendants had failed to cite any case
in which a reward for past contribution had been upheld for any
service other than military.17 The court also cited two cases decided after the district court's ruling that cast doubt on the constitutionality of distinguishing on the basis of residency. IS
In the first case, Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service
Commission,19 the Second Circuit held that favoring prior state
residents when rewarding citizens for participating in military
service was not a legitimate state purpose. 20 In addition, the
court found the distinction between veterans who had been residents at the time they entered the military and those who had
not, was not rationally related to any legitimate state purpose. 21
The United States Supreme Court, in the second case,
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,22 invalidated a statute
that granted Vietnam veterans partial tax exemption only if
they had been state residents prior to May 8, 1976.28 The Court
held that rewarding only prior reside~ts is not a legitimate state
16. [d. (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982» and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969». In Zobel, the State of Alaska had imposed a statutory scheme under
which it distributed the income derived from its vast natural resources to its residents in
varying amounts, based upon length of residency. The state attempted to justify the
distinctions it had created by stating that the scheme's purpose was to apportion benefits in recognition of undefined contributions of various kinds which residents may have
made during their residency. However, the Supreme Court ruled that rewarding residents for such past contributions was not a legitimate state purpose. Zobel, 457 U.S. at
61.
Shapiro involved a durational residency requirement under which a state resident
was ineligible to receive welfare assistance until he had resided in the state for at least
one year. The state argued that the classification should be sustained as an atttempt to
distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they had
made through the payment of taxes. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that such an
apportionment of state services violated the equal protection clause. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at
633.
17. 770 F.2d at 775.
18. [d.

19. 755 F.2d 266 (2nd Cir.) prob. juris. noted sub nom. Attorney General of New
York v. Soto-Lopez, 105 S. Ct. 3523 (1985), argued 54 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1986)
(No. 84-1803).
20. 755 F.2d at 274.
21. [d. at 277.
22. 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985).
23. [d. at 2869.
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purpose.24 Furthermore, it found that a distinction between residents based on when they arrived in the state bore no rational
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of compensating resident veterans for wartime services.1I11
Relying on Soto-Lopez and Hooper, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Guam statute in issue was based on an impermissible distinction between two classes of residents. 26 The court
determined that there was no legitimate purpose in rewarding
established residents for the same conduct for which more recent residents were not rewarded. 27
The court also found that even if the bona fide resident requirement of the statute did have a legitimate state purpose, its
distinction between classses of resident civil servants was not rationally related to the object of the statute.1I8 The court explained that the asserted goal of "rewarding, encouraging and
compensating persons for the alleged sacrifices" of completing a
higher education would not be furthered in any way by distinguishing resident civil servants who had not resided in Guam at
the time they entered college from those who had. 29
III. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit, using minimal scrutiny in its equal protection analysis, invalidated the bona fide resident requirement
of the Guam statute. In addition to finding an illegitimate state
purpose, the court closely analyzed the relationship of the statute to the alleged state purpose and correctly concluded that
there was no rational basis in distinguishing between Guam residents who had resided in Guam upon entering college and those
who had not. 30 This ruling means that in the future all Guam
government employees who have worked for the government for
at least ten years and who received their college degrees after
24. Id. at 2868-69.
25. Id. at 2867.
26. 770 F.2d at 776.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29.Id.
30.Id.
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June 1, 1945, will be uniformly rewarded by receiving retroactive
retirement credit for time spent attending college.
Maria Mandolini-Astengo*

·Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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